Travel Bans and Stockpiling Can Cripple the Ebola Response Supply Chain

By Jarrod Goentzel

Fear of an Ebola outbreak in the United States has spurred two key proposals for preventing the spread of this deadly disease: travel bans from West Africa and stockpiling Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

These measures have merit, but they could also severely disrupt the supply chains that deliver the workers and supplies that are critical to fighting the Ebola virus.

Stockpile of personal protective equipment in Ohio (Photo: Ohio Department of Health)

Travel Bans

Many public officials are calling for travel bans from countries most affected by the disease: Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Some countries and individual airlines have already implemented such measures.

Flight restrictions are fairly easy to implement, but have broad implications. Mid-August cancellations implemented in Senegal provide a good illustration. Brussels Air – one of two airlines continuing flights into Liberia – had to suddenly halt flights because it was using the airport in Dakar, Senegal, as a stopover en route to Monrovia. Brussels Air was able to rework its timetable and resume flights after several days. This temporary outage not only delayed arrival for aid workers booked on these flights but also critical cargo of medical supplies, including supplies sent by our lab.

Advocates of bans argue that special charters can replace commercial air for humanitarian purposes. But the decision in Senegal also halted service provided by the U.H. Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) on August 22 until a special facility could be built; flights resumed again on September 25, over one month later. To stay ahead of an outbreak, alternate transportation capacity for aid workers and supplies must be fully in place prior to implementation of any travel bans.

Establishing new air transportation networks takes time and significant funding. As of October 5, the UN had transported a total of 655 passengers with its air service and had recently added a 737 between Ghana and Liberia twice a week. Privately funded air bridges, such as Airlink for cargo from the U.S., are providing additional capacity. Finally, it takes time for humanitarian organizations to piece together a supply chain spanning new networks of donated services.

The public health debate regarding the effectiveness of travel bans will no doubt continue. In making decisions, politicians must also consider the supply chain impact of eliminating commercial air capacity that has been shaped by market forces and made reliable by years of execution.

PPE Stockpiling

Recent Ebola cases in the U.S. have heighted awareness of the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) that is critical for health workers. Fueled by health sector preparedness as well as rising personal panic (sales on Amazon are soaring), manufacturing capacity for PPE may be become constrained. Already, the State of Ohio is buffering its stockpile, and some distributors are citing supply concerns.

Capacity constraints or bottlenecks combined with volatile demand, such as that faced during an outbreak, escalate the importance of coordinated planning and prioritization. Fortunately, two international organizations took the early lead in matching PPE supply and demand. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has led Ebola treatment on the ground in West Africa from the beginning, determining the standards for care and health worker safety and quantifying needs. In early September, UNICEF raised the issue of manufacturing capacity for PPE and began coordinating with key suppliers. Together with the WHO, MSF and UNICEF have sent clear requirements to manufacturers, which have responded. DuPont added shifts and has more than tripled production since March.

However, a few more high-profile cases could rapidly escalate stockpiling efforts in the public and private sector and across geographies. With manufacturing already running at peak capacity, supplies may begin to fall short. Similar situations have been considered before, such as with H5N1 in 2005, where coordinated planning is critical in allocating limited inventories.

Supply chain research indicates that risk pooling – where vital global inventories are co-managed as a common resource – is critical in maximizing the impact of a scarce commodity. As an alternative to stockpiling locally, decision makers in the public and private sector should consider a pooled procurement process, led by the WHO consulting with health departments in affected countries (which includes CDC as the U.S. is affected), that allocates stocks to health workers most at risk.

Adapting public health strategies during an outbreak is critical in preventing the spread of deadly disease. However, hastily considered strategies to control movement and hoard supplies could dramatically impact the availability of our most critical resources – health workers and protective equipment – to fight the disease at its core.

Applying Social Media at American Red Cross

By Lauren Seelbach

During my summer internship at the American Red Cross (ARC), I explored how social media can be used in the disaster context. Examples could range from identifying pockets of need to fostering communication with affected individuals.

President Obama touring the Red Cross Digital Command Center (10/30/2012) Photo: http://en.community.dell.com

My project focused on how decision-makers at the ARC are using social media. I interviewed thirty-eight individuals in disaster operations to understand (1) how they were currently using social media in disaster operations, (2) what specific decisions had been informed using social media, and (3) what functionality they felt was lacking in making the link between social posts and decisions.

Based on the analysis of these results, several key recommendations were made on how to apply social media data to operational decision-making. They are to:

• Define and incorporate a process for using social media in decision-making in existing policies or develop new policies for this process, considering that:
  • The process should be defined for an operational role;
  • The process should be focused on identifying information on which an operational decision can be made;
  • The opportunity to work with any provider of a social monitoring service (e.g. Radian6, Dataminr, HootSuite) should include a process to further refine the software to address the unique needs of a decision-maker;
• Develop or refine keyword groups in social monitoring software (if using) to pull posts focused on needs and client feedback;
• Develop an operationally focused training module for social monitoring software platforms and encourage wide participation among staff in headquarters and regional locations;
• If the organization is reporting social data, incorporate data that is regionally focused, as opposed to or in addition to the “big picture” reporting.

These findings represent actions that any organization can take to increasingly apply social media in operational decision-making, no matter the context. They are relatively simple policies and procedures that solidify the place of social media as a relevant information source in decision-making.

Commercial Air Cancellations Quarantine Ebola Supplies

By Jarrod Goentzel

(Photo: European Commission DG ECHO/Flickr/Creative Commons)

Nine pallets of caps, gowns, boots, and masks are sitting at the JFK airport in New York City awaiting the next available flight to West Africa. This might appear to be a routine shipment delay, but it is not. The supplies are needed by doctors in the fight against the deadly Ebola virus, and the holdup highlights a worrying gap in the humanitarian supply chain.

The personal protective equipment (PPE) – shipped by our team of doctors and logisticians in Boston^[1] – is destined for the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in Liberia, which will then distribute supplies to locations at the front lines of the health crisis such as JFK Memorial Hospital in Monrovia. PPE is essential in the fight against the Ebola virus, protecting the brave doctors and nurses who continue to diagnose and treat patients every day at their own peril.

Our “freight forwarder” collected the pallets on August 18 for consolidated air freight service, which normally means airport-to-airport delivery within three to five days using space available on commercial (passenger) airlines or dedicated cargo flights to the destination. By consolidating cargo from various shippers, freight forwarders reduce the cost of air shipment significantly from express services, which is important when shipping multiple pallets.

And here is the rub. In spite of repeated statements from the World Health Organization (WHO) advising against travel bans to and from affected countries, commercial airlines have suspended service. Clearly this constrains the ability for the international humanitarian community to send aid workers. But due to the role passenger flights play in providing air cargo capacity, these travel restrictions are effectively quarantining critical medical supplies outside Ebola-affected regions.

As of August 25, with our pallets still sitting at JFK airport, there are only two options remaining for commercial air service to Liberia: Royal Air Maroc (with service three times per week from Casablanca) and Delta (which is halting service August 31). Most of the flights to Liberia, and their air cargo capacity, were suspended:

• Arik Air: Banned flights to Liberia and Sierra Leone beginning July 28. Flights to Guinea are continuing, with passengers screened for symptoms.
• Asky Airlines: Stopped flights to Liberia and Sierra Leone on July 29.
• British Air: All routes suspended to Sierra Leone and Liberia on August 5.
• Gambia Bird: Suspended routes to Sierra Leone and Liberia on August 15.
• Kenya Airways: Suspended commercial flights to Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone on August 19.
• Brussels Airlines: Cancelled flights to Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia beginning August 23.

Humanitarian aid organizations, familiar with responding to disasters where normal air service is disrupted, are chartering flights to cover the gap in air service. However, even humanitarian flights are subject to travel bans, as Senegal recently demonstrated by canceling UN Humanitarian Air Service flights to Ebola-affected countries.

Flying cargo in the space unused by passenger luggage (especially as baggage fees encourage a shift to carry-ons) has long been an efficient option for time-sensitive freight. Travel bans, which at face value seem to prevent the spread of disease, actually constrain the crucial human and material resources required to manage the Ebola outbreak.

Fortunately while writing this blog entry, news broke that Brussels Airlines is resuming flights to Liberia. Let’s hope this is a trend, reconnecting health workers in West Africa with global stocks of critical supplies. Maybe soon our nine pallets will be moving rapidly from airside at JFK airport to patient-side at JFK hospital.

 

^[1] Pallets of critical medical supplies were assembled and shipped by a team from Boston Children’s Hospital (BCH), the University of Massachusetts Medical School (UUMS), and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Doctors at BCH and UMMS have been working in Liberia for over seven years developing training programs for physicians and nurses. During this crisis, these doctors are supporting their Liberian colleagues by gathering in-kind donations from medical suppliers and transporting them using crowdsourced funds with logistical support from the MIT Humanitarian Response Lab.

Identifying Macro Trends in the Non-Profit International Relief Sector

By Thomas Henry Marcil

All industrial sectors of the economy—from insurance to wireless telecommunications—operate in a state somewhere between full competition and monopoly. The same applies to the non-profit services sector, including charities involved in humanitarian and international relief operations. Though it can be uncomfortable to imagine non-profit organizations, built around the kindness of individuals and governments, fighting for revenue and market share, this spirited battle is very much the case in the humanitarian sector.

Since it is difficult to directly measure competition in an industrial sector, economists and policy analysts (carefully) use concentration as a rough corollary. High and low sectoral concentration, depending on the nature of the industry, can offer either benefits or drawbacks to consumers. Industries that are highly concentrated—for example, automobile and cigarette manufacturers—can pass on savings to consumers given superior economies of scale and network effects, yet may also encourage needlessly high barriers to entry for other firms wishing to enter the market. On the other end of the spectrum, highly unconcentrated industries—like the residential and commercial construction sector—can benefit consumers by incentivizing superior quality at the expense of providing consumers an excessive quantity of choices.

Curious to understand more about humanitarian efforts, I wrote a paper for a class last fall identifying macro trends of non-profit international relief firms, including the concentration of this sector and implications for humanitarian aid delivery. All charities that file for tax exemption in the United States – including those who identify as international relief and humanitarian organizations – must file an IRS form 990, providing a useful source of information regarding this market. I used these data for my paper.

The chart included here plots the total revenue accrued by this sector and its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) – a commonly used measure of industrial

Total revenue accrued and HHI Index over time for the international relief sector

concentration – as a function of time. Since 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell, there have been three major developmental stages in this sector in regards to the quantity of revenue humanitarian organizations acquire from donors, and where this revenue is being allocated.

• From 1989 to 1998, humanitarian organizations went through a stage of capacity expansion, corresponding to the end of the Cold War, which saw a rapid increase in the number of humanitarian organizations. The HHI decreases during this period, reflecting the increasingly fragmented market.
• From 1998 into 2008, the market saw a period of volumetric revenue expansion, where humanitarian organizations experienced a five-fold surge in funding. The corresponding rise HHI indicates this surge in funding was increasingly concentrated among the larger organizations.
• Finally, from 2008 to today the market has experienced a period of volumetric revenue contraction, a result of the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, and more competition.

Not being a seasoned expert in the sector, I was not sure how to interpret these results. I present them here as an observation about the relationship between the amount and the concentration of humanitarian funding. Further study to understand the state of competition in the international relief sector could help improve governmental policy, organizational strategy, and ultimately the quality of aid delivered to beneficiaries.

Tracking the Response to Typhoon Haiyan

Survivors collect water from a broken water pipe in an area devastated by Typhoon Haiyan on November 12, 2013 in Leyte, Philippines. Four days after the Typhoon Haiyan devastated the region many have nothing left, they are without food or power and most lost their homes. Around 10,000 people are feared dead in the strongest typhoon to hit the Philippines this year. Photo: Dondi Tawatao, Getty Images

By Dr. Jarrod Goentzel, Director of the MIT Humanitarian Response Lab

After Super Typhoon Haiyan struck, I saw several images, videos, and anecdotes that made my gut ache. People in crowded clinics waiting for medicine to arrive, others congregating around scarce water pipes filling containers for family and friends, and saddest of all, survivors mournfully searching through makeshift morgues to identify loved ones.

During a massive disaster response, news reporters always find these stories that sadden me…and frustrate me. Inevitably, journalists ask affected people why the government and aid agencies cannot coordinate the response to meet the dire needs of victims. Interviewees usually do not know why the response is slow, but they rightly assert that the problem needs to be solved.  Reporters then find their way to the airport to find aid items – some of which may have helped the people they just interviewed – sitting on the tarmac. They ask airport officials and aid agencies why more goods are not being moved to the disaster area quicker. The response is that the situation is very dynamic and complex.

The picture is complete for the news articles and broadcasts about the disaster: needy residents are unable to understand why aid is slow, and officials are not able to clearly explain why.

Leaving the story at that point is what frustrates me. Having worked actively with humanitarian organizations on logistics for over ten years now, I know the good work that is done after these tragic situations to explain where and why aid was too slow. I see the passion of aid workers who are just as frustrated as the affected residents that the system does not work better. They identify issues and propose solutions. Then I see the incremental progress implemented during the next big disaster. The cluster approach¹ proposed after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami has been implemented and improved over the years.

We need both narratives during a disaster – those tracking the unmet needs and those following the coordinated response efforts . There are good sources of information about how the system is working and how many people are being served during a crisis. I have listed several of my usual sources below (note that they do have a logistics angle). These sources may be a bit dry – they are aimed to disseminate facts to other responders, not stories for the public – but they provide the information for the media consumer who is left asking: what is being done for that needy survivor Anderson Cooper just interviewed?

I also want reporters to continue finding the people whose needs are not being met appropriately (as long as their planes do not block the flow of any essential commodities). Although frustrating to me in isolation, these stories identify the service gaps in order to focus the response efforts and mobilize the resources we need to find solutions.

The aid community is just as motivated by the sad stories as the public. And they are just as frustrated when the complex system of humanitarian response does not do enough. Aid workers and the concerned public need to continue following both storylines and demanding improvements.

Information Sources for Typhoon Haiyan

Philippines National Government
http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph – the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Center (NDRRMC) leads the response efforts for the Philippine government; frequent and lengthy situation reports track the impact (with several large tables of numbers), the national emergency response management efforts, and international humanitarian assistance

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and sector clusters
http://www.unocha.org/crisis/typhoonhaiyan and http://philippines.humanitarianresponse.info – portals with links to each of the clusters where you find more details about that sector; a key document is the Typhoon Haiyan Action Plan (12 Nov 2013), which lists the strategic objectives and key projects, with their funding requirements, for over 20 organizations

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/appeals – archive with early information bulletins; the appeal (12 Nov 2013) outlining actions planned to meet the immediate needs of the people affected and support the Philippine Red Cross in delivering humanitarian assistance; operation updates to track the progress of activities

ReliefWeb
http://reliefweb.int/disaster/tc-2013-000139-phl – an independent portal that archives documents spanning various organizations

Logistics Cluster
http://logcluster.org/ops/phl13a – portal with various documents and maps describing logistics efforts; meeting minutes and situation reports offer the best overall picture of efforts to move critical supplies; the Concept of Operations outlines the coordination mechanisms (among response organizations and with government, military, etc.), information management (e.g. customs, local transporters, infrastructure status), and common services (e.g. transportation, warehousing) to fill identified gaps in logistics capacity

Donors
http://fts.unocha.org – tracks donations made toward the UN OCHA Typhoon Haiyan Action Plan; note some donors have portals with their own situation reports and assistance efforts.

__________________

¹ The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners, established the cluster approach for inter-agency coordination around focus areas such as shelter, nutrition, health, logistics, etc. For more information see http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc.

Perks to Drive Efficiency

By Dr. Jarrod Goentzel

Companies continually tinker with incentive programs for their employees to align individual behavior with business goals. Visiting a relatively new venture in Zimbabwe, I found a unique incentive scheme to drive efficiency…literally.

A Pulse employee prepares his new truck

Pulse Pharmaceuticals began distributing medicine in the capital city of Harare in 2009. It started small, with only one product line and ambition. By the time I visited in January 2013, the company had grown to around 40 employees and $20 million in sales. As the company grew, some employees had earned a particularly generous company perk – a company vehicle. Note that I did not say company car, because all company vehicles are pickup trucks.

Why no cars? Because this employee incentive scheme aligns with the company’s distribution system. Orders in by noon are delivered the same day, and many pharmacies are open until 8pm. Pulse employees live in various areas of the city. They can make deliveries, which are primarily small pharmaceutical products, on their commute home. Even the CFO is engaged in logistics on a regular basis.

Besides the obvious logistical advantages, this incentive scheme works on several levels. While receiving a company

Cars await distribution to Pulse employees in Zimbabwe

vehicle is a notable acknowledgement of an employee’s past contributions, it is also encourages loyalty for key employees to the company. The perk also fits with my observations about the corporate culture at Pulse, which is very entrepreneurial and focused on growth; Pulse rewards individuals with assets that enable them to continue investing their time, particularly their commute, in growing profits. Finally, the perk is not insignificant; tangible assets are highly valued in a country where recent experience with hyperinflation diminished confidence in monetary incentives.

I’m not sure this is the start of a trend. Walmart does not give its top performers a Peterbilt with sleeper cab. Even UPS, where managers often help out temporarily by delivering packages during peak seasons, is not sending its execs home with a brown truck for their personal use. But for a hungry startup in Zimbabwe, this creative incentive scheme aligns personal, cultural, AND logistical goals in a unique way to really deliver the goods.

Three Weeks in Darfur

By Tim Russell

I recently started working with the World Food Programme (WFP) in Khartoum, Sudan. The project we are collaborating on is designed to build a predictive model that can be used to assist with voucher programming as WFP considers expanding the percentage of food assistance fulfilled with vouchers. The plan is for me to split time between Khartoum and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where I’m currently living with my family.

In December I was able to spend three weeks with WFP in Sudan. I experienced normal “working a new country” issues such as how to get around without a car, should I flag down that rickshaw, inability to speak the language, and gaining access to local currency while facing US economic sanctions and high inflation.

The sanctions render credit cards useless and force you to carry cash into the country. In the three weeks I was first there, the unofficial exchange rate dropped  by 10%. I quickly learned to exchange small amounts to reduce losses.

After a few starts and stops, security cleared a trip for me to visit the North Darfur office in El Fasher. I was cleared to stay in the guesthouse, visit the office, and go to a camp in the city limits. This trip was the best part of my visit to Sudan.  I was able to talk to people redeeming vouchers and traders providing critical food commodities. It felt as if the traders enjoyed explaining how their operations worked. I was also able to spend time with fantastic WFP staff that built and maintained the successful voucher program in El Fasher – professionals through and through. To top it all off, the cook at the guesthouse in El Fasher is known as the best in WFP and put the restaurants near my hotel in Khartoum to shame. We even had fresh baked cookies.

Things I learned during this trip to Sudan…

1) I am a distraction, no matter how much I try not to be. In the past, while working on network optimization at Pepsi, I had to make time for consultants in my schedule. Now I am the one asking others to put aside their work to help me do mine.

2) WFP has supply chain thinking in its DNA. It was refreshing to ask questions about transportation and warehousing and not have people blankly stare back at you. Everyone from human resources to drivers understand the importance of a supply chain frame of mind.

3) It gets COLD in Darfur at night – extra blankets and a room heater kind of cold.

4) Khartoum is very friendly, and no one I spoke to held me, as a US citizen, personally responsible for US sanctions.

5) Darfur is beautiful. It is a desert but with wild cereals growing after the rains and black rocky hills.

6) I was struck by how long people have been living in the camps outside El Fasher and how permanent they looked. To my untrained eye, they appeared as a suburb of the city. Houses made of mud brick are surrounded by well-established hospitals, thriving schools with kids running all around, and active markets inside the camp.

I will be heading back to Sudan soon to continue the research project. Next we will focus on data gathering. I hope get out of Khartoum and see more of Sudan, specifically the growing regions around Gedarif. I also am looking forward to talking to more people involved in the food value chain. Those conversations have been my favorite part of the work to date. Everyone has been excited to share his or her expertise.

Why More Technology Isn’t the (Only) Solution for Disaster Response

By Julia Moline

When you read an article or hear a story or see firsthand how hard it is to manage information after a disaster, it’s tempting to think that if only we had the right systems, all of our problems would go away. Technology can achieve amazing things. We can use aerial imagery to allocate response teams; we can trace tweets to find people trapped in a building; we can share information with people all over the world over computers and mobile devices. So why can’t we make this work?

The first hindrance is money, which can be a large barrier for non-profits. There are also number of issues that technology itself cannot address. These challenges are especially pronounced in areas that bring a lot of different kinds of responding groups together, including anywhere voluntary aid meets government response.

1. Different groups need systems for different reasons. In-kind donations management is a good example of this—it makes sense to have a single system that allows donors, beneficiaries, and decision-makers to see what’s needed and what’s available. Systems like the National Donations Management Network are built to help meet various needs through selective user access, multiple data filters, and custom reports. But as the system continually expands to meet more needs, it becomes less intuitive for the average user.

2. Database skills are not a given. The people who respond to disasters range from extremely tech-savvy grassroots organizations like Occupy Sandy to retired first responders with decades of field experience but little knowledge of technical systems. Most of the government and aid workers who get involved fall somewhere in the middle, so they need training (or instructions) on how to use a new technology or database. Often the system only goes part of the way toward accomplishing their tasks. Without the skills or the confidence to make the system work for them, aid workers often resort to simpler systems or even manual methods.

3. Frustrations with systems lead people to develop workarounds. In a high-pressure response environment, you only have time to do the minimum to get your job done. So spending time entering data or trying to run a report seems like a waste. Instead, you start printing out the individual records you need and handwriting your notes. Or, you don’t completely give up on the database, but you start to enter your information in the comments field instead of trying to track down all of the places you’re supposed enter data. Or, you just pick up the phone and have a conversation with someone. So you get your task done right now, but when your shift is up, the next person doesn’t know where you logged everything. And when his shift is up, you don’t know where his stuff is. You want to fall back on the system, but by this point, its information is outdated, and you have to figure out who has the information you need.

4. Sometimes, people just don’t want to share. Organizations can be territorial or suspicious of each other’s ulterior motives. It can be unclear who is responsible for keeping certain information up to date. And sometimes, people just don’t get along (especially when the environment is tense and the stakes high). So even when a system has the capacity to collect and synthesize data from a lot of different sources, some people might not want to use it, because they don’t want to grant others access. If enough users start to feel this way and stop using the database, it will no longer hold enough information to make it worth others’ time.

That is not to say that we should give up on developing technological systems for response. On the contrary: we have an obligation to continue to develop and improve our systems so that we’re best able to respond to disasters. But to do so without recognizing these challenges would be a waste of technology and a failure of development. We must develop systems with an emphasis on user-friendliness and intuitiveness, implement data management goals into planning programs, and make a concerted effort to train responders on basic data management principles.

Technology alone isn’t going to “fix” emergency management. But if we’re deliberate about making technology a part of the way we prepare for disasters, we can go a long way toward a more efficient, effective response.

Muck Out

 

By Julia Moline

When a house floods, it doesn’t just fill with water; there’s dirt, household chemicals, and, often, raw sewage in the mix. In the response world, this toxic brew is known as muck. To clean a flooded home, it’s not just a matter of getting the actual muck out, though.  You have to remove all damaged furniture and finishes, clean all surfaces, and dry everything out to prevent mold growth. On top of all of that, you have to document damage for insurance purposes.

In an event like Superstorm Sandy, which had such widespread impacts, muck outs are a case study in the challenges of disaster response and recovery. They are deeply personal and a challenge of scale, at once slow going and a race against time.

I spent a few days working with the New York City Donations Coordination Team in the aftermath of Sandy. Coming in looking to learn something about how response works, and with a background in flood mitigation and flood damage-resistant materials, I was fascinated by muck out coordination efforts. It was becoming clear that muck outs would be the next major need, particularly as a cold front approached and shelter space began to run low. As coordination proceeded, I noticed four themes emerging that spoke to larger challenges of emergency management in general.

1. Government-NGO coordination. The real work of rebuilding can’t happen until homes are clean and dry, but the government doesn’t have the resources to muck out each of the tens of thousands of flooded homes.  Formal partnerships with VOAD groups¹ can help provide the needed assistance; a number of those have the resources and experience to help with large-scale muck out operations. Groups such as Team Rubicon and the Southern Baptist Disaster Relief have experience from previous floods and understand what’s needed. Local organizations with access to large numbers of volunteers can be additional resources, even though they may lack training and experience. This convergence of organizations and resources presents an opportunity and challenge that, if managed well, can lead to a successful and empowering response.  Managed poorly, it can lead to duplication of efforts, disenfranchisement, and, worst of all, inability to help disaster victims. 

2. Rapid action, the right way. After a disaster, you try to act as quickly as possible to get life back to normal. With muck outs, however, up-front speed might not always translate to time savings or better results in the long run. It’s tempting to skip some of these steps, or to only take the first step of getting the muck out of the house. If a house isn’t allowed to dry fully before reconstruction begins, moisture can lead to long-term mold problems that can require years and thousands of dollars to fix. If damage is not documented, the insurance reimbursement process can be prolonged. Doing these things all at once can save a lot of time and money. It’s more important to take the time needed to do the job right, rather than focusing on doing the job fast.

3. Data collection and situational awareness. To ensure that every area in need is covered, to avoid duplication of efforts, and to provide necessary follow up with homeowners, tracking and mapping is a critical step in a coordinated muck out effort. Because no single organization has the capacity to meet all of the needs, mapping also helps to ensure that each area is covered. Still, few organizations can spare the people to canvas needs and collect enough information to create a meaningful, complete dataset, and this is a significant issue that needs to be addressed.

4. Supplies and logistics. Having the people to do muck outs isn’t enough; cleaning supplies, personal protective equipment (gloves, goggles, etc), hammers and other tools are needed in bulk. Although volunteer efforts and donations are necessarily managed separately, close coordination is required to make sure that volunteers have the resources they need to do what they show up to do.

These four themes are common to all areas of disaster response and boil down to a few key elements: personnel, process, plans, and products. Each of these elements must be present for a successful response. When failures in response occur, looking for improvements in each key area can help to improve response. For instance, a map of affected areas will do no good if there is no coordination among government and not-for-profit organizations. Truckloads of personal protective equipment (PPE) and cleaning supplies will not solve anything if there is no way to get those supplies to muck out volunteers. And thorough action plans will not be successful if there is no mechanism for training and information sharing.

New York City is one of the best-equipped cities in the world for such large-scale coordination challenges, and will hopefully be able to learn and improve its own processes. As Sandy recovery continues for the months to come and winter approaches, we are sure to see new relationships forming, new information flows, and innovative data collection and tracking techniques.

¹Link to: http://www.nvoad.org/

Engineering for Development at USAID

By Hisham Bedri

I recently attended the USAID Higher Education Solutions Network (HESN) launch event in Washington DC as part of the MIT delegation. As a belt-way outsider, I always thought USAID and government agencies were distant ivory towers–untouchable by peasants like myself, however this event changed my perspective on USAID. During the event, professors and students from the HESN universities (composed of MIT, UC Berkeley, Duke, Michigan State, William and Mary, Makerere, and Texas A&M) had the chance to meet the leadership of USAID and learn about their renewed commitment to harness the power of science and technology for international development. What was it like to be in the National Academy of Sciences building and the National Press Club next to the top USAID officials and administrators? Remember Willy Wonka and the Chocolate factory? Yeah, It was like that.

Senior Advisor to President Obama on Science and Technology John Holdren and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shaw at USAID HESN Kickoff Event

Just as Charlie walked through a factory filled with magic and whimsy, I was walking through one of the epicenters of international development in the world. This is where policy is made. These are the people who make the hard decisions. USAID opened its doors allowing us to meet its top officials, and gave us knowledge of its inner structure and capabilities.

The best take-away from the trip was meeting university professors, students, USAID officials, and other honored guests, all of whom were passionate about international development and science. I was surprised to see so many development labs and such a strong commitment to appropriate technology. There is a growing interest among engineers and scientists to focus their efforts on developing regions and emerging markets.

During our time together – shuttling between offices, eating meals, and participating in a science fair – there were plenty of opportunities to “geek out” and discuss research in depth with peers. I particularly enjoyed discussing geo-spatial analysis with researchers at the College of William and Mary and food security and conflict with researchers at Texas A&M. In addition to informal socializing, I was very interested in the work presented during the science fair. While a lot of impressive research was shown, I think first prize goes to UC Berkeley’s iPhone based microscope for its simplicity and potential impact on remote medical diagnosis.

There was also debate, particularly about how to approach global challenges within engineering education. There is a need for more engineers with skills, passion and the ability to work across conventional fields. Some argued that it is time for a new field: “development engineering and sciences,” while others believe in changing our traditional engineering and science curricula to incorporate the concepts of sustainability and development early. No matter the solution favored by individuals, it was evident to everyone that change was coming.

Difficult questions were posed and facilitated in round tables by Washington’s young leadership. I had the opportunity to meet Presidential Management Fellows (PMF), Presidential Innovation Fellows (PIF), and American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) fellows. These young people are rising stars within the government and are a driving force for HESN – providing organizational backbone as points of contact for universities and finding ways to connect research with USAID needs.  Meeting this group of young people contrasted with my prior vision of government as a clunky, uninspiring machine. This is not your grand-dad’s government; seeing the inner-workings of USAID made me believe that change is possible and that there is serious hope for the future.

MIT crew at HESN kickoff event in front of National Academy of Sciences building

USAID’s new commitment to science is an important change to the world of international development. International aid and development has become a dynamic field with huge changes in philosophy since the 1960’s. What was once an avenue to give assistance and show compassion (through in-kind donations and investment) has become a specific mission to make lasting and serious change. Officials at the agency were very excited about the use of mobile technologies, geo-spatial analysis, and statistical evaluation for the sake of development goals like healthcare and food security. Furthermore, USAID is playing an active role in crowdsourcing solutions to development problems. The office of Innovation and Development Alliances (IDEA) has organized hackathons and open-data challenges to address development issues. This is exciting because USAID is embracing new opinions and hearing new voices.

I’m impressed by this new commitment because we are taking an appropriate approach to science and technology. Technology by itself is not the silver bullet that will save the world. Often there is a great deal of excitement surrounding newly designed products that turn out to be ineffective in the field. Unless a product is designed with culture, supply chains, and sustainability in mind, products deployed in the field will probably fail. Rarely do we hear when a development product or project fails or learn from our mistakes. The silent failure of products holds back the revolutionary power of technology in international development. USAID is acutely aware of this effect and is combatting it in its new commitment by including programs (such as CITE) to evaluate technologies across multiple platforms, including technical feasibility and supply-chain robustness, and produce easily accessible reports to inform designers about results.

USAID plays an important role in international development and international relations for the US. This new commitment to science and research partnership is very exciting. If humanity can engineer a way to the moon, ending poverty should also be achievable. This partnership is a giant leap in the right direction.

Hillary Clinton on HESN: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=hhXGKeGoX_s

Where does MIT play a part in this?

MIT was awarded the USAID partnership for its IDIN and CITE programs. The brilliant minds at D-Lab, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, and the Humanitarian Response Lab have drafted these two programs to fill a gap in innovating for interanational development. The first part of MIT’s propsal is IDIN, a global network of innovators sharing ideas and best-practices. The second part of MIT’s proposal is CITE (Comprehensive Initiative on Technology Evaluation). These two initiatives are critical for USAID’s technology transfer and innovation efforts.